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Learning to Innovate vs. Learning to 
Manufacture:Towards an Alternative 
Technology Strategy 
- - Introduction 
(t'X It is useful, both analytically, and also in terms of delineating a 
~> 
- manageable area of inquiry, to distinguish between three 
categories of industrial technology relevant to the post- 
.k _ ^independence Indian experience. The first of the categories V) 
comprises an epochal genre, of new sources of energy from 
'Z~ nuclear processes, of advanced forms of communication and 
control based on electronics, on extending the boundaries of 
technological inquiry itself through space and ocean 
exploration and, finally, on developing new methods of 
processing material such as biotechnology. Both the initial and 
the sustaining impetus for these efforts came largely from their 
perceived nexus with the security concerns of the Indian State. 
On the whole, in scientific and technological terms, there have 
been considerable achievements in these fields. 
The second category of technology to have received 
systematic, if less sustained, attention is that of the indigenous 
manufacture of basic raw materials, intermediate goods, and the 
more complex capital goods (steel, petrochemicals, non-ferrous 
metals, large scale machine-tools and electrical equipment). 
Manufacturing units in the public sector were established, 
largely during the second and third Five Year Plan periods in 
these sectors. Here, too, substantial capabilities were achieved 
technologically, particularly in the training of skilled designers 
and shop floor operatives. In these cases however, policies have 
been subject to a degree of political vagary. Due to a variety of 
reasons both connected with the slow growth of the economy 
which led to poor capacity utilisation in these units, and their 
perceived relative distance from primary defence concerns, the 
State permitted attrition in the actual innovative capability of 
these units in the subsequent plan periods. These phases of 
attrition were marked by the Union budgets of 1976, 1980, 
1985, and 1991, during each of which a fiscal environment 
which militated against the technologically productive 
interaction between these manufacturing units, and their 
potential customers, largely in the private manufacturing sector 
was further reinforced. This process of attrition has been 
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documented in some detail though the emphasis, perhaps naturally, has been 
on the pressures exerted by transnational corporations (as suppliers of ready- 
to-use manufacturing technology) on State policy towards the public sector, 
and insufficiently on the conceptual, organisational and political 
impediments to establishing the technological interaction mentioned earlier. 
The public enterprises themselves, the institutional form of this exercise in 
regard to the creation of technological capacity, have been severely 
handicapped in consolidating their achieved level of innovational capacity. 
Principally, this has been due to their inability to generate surpluses, which 
could relieve them of dependence on the general budget to support their 
capital expenditure programmes. With this dependence goes a debilitating 
subordination to technologically wayward policies. In spite of these pressures, 
many of these enterprises have shown a considerable degree of dynamism. 
It is, in fact, precisely this lack of technological linkages which is one of 
the areas of concern to this paper, which aims to examine the reasons for the 
torpidity apparent in the third genre of technology, that of final goods 
manufacture within Indian private industry. It is with this third level of 
technological systems, predominantly in the batch processing industries that 
the failure has been the most marked. These systems are embodied in the 
private corporate sector, which in terms of the number of firms and of 
technological transfer agreements, dominate the country's industrial sector. 
The Indian National System of Innovation 
The concept underlying policies for establishing a private sector 
manufacturing base in the batch processing industries in India was the phased 
manufacturing programme (PMP). This, as the name implies, was a 
programme drawn up jointly by an Indian firm and a foreign collaborator, 
approved by the government. Under it, specific components were expected to 
be produced within the country and their import to be prohibited after a set 
time period. Thus, moving through the stages of the import of complete units 
and, subsequently, the assembly of these units from imported components, 
the PMP was expected to lead to the growth of generalised indigenous 
manufacturing capacity. While it was not presumed that all components 
could be manufactured indigenously, it was expected that the programme 
would cover items where economies of scale could be achieved, either in the 
manufacturing unit itself, or in ancillary units that would fully use their 
capacity by providing components to several assemblers. By and large, at the 
level of manufacturing capability, the programme was successful. In terms of 
what is called standard modern technology, India was well placed to produce 
a large range of capital goods. These matched the overall environmental 
conditions (for example, the capacity for preventive maintenance and the 
facilities for major overhauls) not only in India, but in other countries of the 19 
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U Third World. The country was successful in exporting machinery, the 
constraint often lying in its inability to match the credit granting facilities 
a) available to its competitors. 
O Thus, abstracting in the first instance from questions of quality and price, 
0c2 the Indian manufacturing sector has shown impressive post-Independence 
o advances in the sheer range of products indigenously produced. However, 
Z these firms have not been able to generate a base for innovation in design, 
r,n manufacture, quality and reliability, and cost reduction, even taking into 
vo account all the relevant factors: the fact that innovations are nowadays often 
multinational in nature, the necessarily limited home market for products 
and components incorporating advanced technologies, and so on. Even in 
terms of upgrading manufacturing technology, which might not amount to 
an internationally acceptable innovation, the performance of the Indian 
private sector has, with a few notable exceptions, been abysmal. 
Criticism of Indian made products (of their quality, of the lack of 
product innovation and of their price) began almost simultaneously with the 
transition from imports to assembly, in the late 1940s and the mid-1950s. 
These criticisms became more vocal with the deepening effects of import- 
substitution and indigenisation, which accompanied the Second and Third 
Five-Year Plans (1956-60 and 1961-65). By the 1980s, with the replacement 
in the dominant developmental paradigm of import-substituting 
industrialisation with that of export-oriented industrialisation, public 
disenchantment with these characteristics could be used to drown out 
rational discussion of underlying technological issues (Kaplinsky, 1984). 
One of the crucial technological issues sidelined by this paradigmatic 
shift was that of linkages between sectors. Not only does the performance of 
these private sector firms have implications for other companies within the 
same sector, their technological non-performance constrains the effectiveness 
of organisations to which they provide both components and market in the 
previous two technology domains (the epochal and the public sector capital 
goods manufacturers). In other words, too great a degree of dualism (in 
competence) across technological sectors can hold back the progress of the 
more advanced sectors. 
The continued large-scale resort to foreign collaborations in the process 
of diversifying the manufacturing base gave rise to concern over the source of 
technology. Explicit high-level discussion of this issue can be traced to the 
report of the Third CSIR Review Committee, published in 1964. Subsequent 
research showed that lack of relevant technological expertise, perhaps 
inevitable in the historical context of colonialism, could take on a self- 
perpetuating character. Initial imports of capital goods and technical services 
20 needed to start production were accompanied by a degree of external 
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managerial control over decision-making by foreign collaborators, who had 
an interest in continuing to provide these goods and services. However, even 
10 years later, when a technical evaluation committee was established to 
monitor the technological content of collaborations, this appears to have 
been largely an administrative adjunct.' There was some professional 
monitoring of the technological growth of firms that had been granted 
approvals starting from 1973, but it is not clear how effectively this was able 
to force firms into a different mode of operation. Fiscal concessions for the 
establishment of R and D centres easily led to the multiplication of 
organisational fifth wheels. Simply put, Indian policy did not require the 
development of a conception and operational procedures analogous to the 
PMP in the area of technological competence. 
This had its effect even on the functioning of development banking 
institutions in addition to administrative regulatory institutions, where 
conservatism could in any case be expected. In fact, it has been argued that 
the problem was not only that India did not have a technology policy, but 
that its foreign exchange conservation policy was directly responsible for the 
unacceptable levels of performance. Considerations of foreign exchange 
outflows, which flowed from the need to achieve collaboration agreements in 
the most economical way possible, may actually have led to higher costs in the 
longer term. In other words, it was argued, greater flexibility in lumpsum 
and/or royalty payments might actually have resulted in a higher grade of 
information transfer and on fewer restrictions on exports (which would have 
increased the size of the market). 
Much of this line of criticism was, in fact, directed against the implicitly 
Listian philosophy, which the 1950 Fiscal Commission proclaimed as the 
creed of Indian developmental thought. Critics pointed to the unrealistic 
character of attempting import-substitution in a situation where, firstly, the 
market was small, thus preventing the lowering of costs that the achievement 
of economies of scale would allow; and where the lack of competition, both 
internal and from transnational corporations, prevented any incentives for 
Indian firms in sheltered markets to undertake manufacturing innovations.2 
To buttress this argument, critics pointed out that even in specific product 
groups where economies of scale did exist, firm behaviour was little different 
from the general lack of technological dynamism observed elsewhere. 
Further, Indian firms might be excused from investing in R and D on a scale 
necessary to achieve results (comparisons were made of the entire turnover of 
some of the biggest Indian firms with merely the R and D budgets of their 
transnational competitors). However, even when innovations, or laboratory 
scale processes indigenously developed within public sector research 
institutions were available, firms rarely took advantage of these to 21 
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9 commercialise the knowledge through innovations in manufacturing 
m-?- methods.3 
L) The responses required to correct the situation naturally were those 
? implicit in the nature of the analysis and criticism. Markets that would 
Co support manufacture at economically viable scales of production should be 
o3 sought by directing the attention of Indian industry to world demand, if this 
Z were necessary. This would also set standards of quality, price and 
rn expectations of product innovations. Pressure on Indian firms to invest in the 
o manufacture of these commercially new products and processes would come 
as a result of the competition of transnational corporations, which would be 
permitted to operate in the internal Indian market. Manufacturing input 
costs could be made comparable for Indian and foreign firms by reducing 
duties on imported items, which would provide corresponding pressures on 
Indian component manufacturers and input suppliers to improve quality and 
reduce prices. Criticism essentially focused on the policy-induced lack of 
incentives for incremental technical change stemming from shopfloor 
initiatives, let alone for innovations that involved coordinated R and D, 
manufacturing and marketing efforts within and across firms. 
The discussion of the technological performance of Indian industry that 
began with the report of the Third CSIR Review Committee in 1964, 
continued through the 1960s and the 1970s, with successive relaxations in the 
administrative regime. During this period, what seems to have happened was 
the greater use of technologically based skill and care in the collaboration 
negotiation process. The technology package was unbundled, approaches 
were made to a greater variety of suppliers and costs were consequently 
reduced. What still predominated, however, was a situation where Indian 
firms were buyers of technology, exchanging cash for knowhow. It was still an 
inevitably weak situation, which all buyers in a near monopolistic market are 
in, whatever the degree of informed skill used in negotiation. 
Collaboration between Indian firms and foreign suppliers of technology 
has been the major channel through which the manufacturing base in the 
country has been diversified (Nayar, 1983). From the Third Five-Year Plan 
(1961-66) onwards, however, debate has centred on the efficacy of this 
mechanism in achieving the goal of self-reliance (India, 1967). This was also the 
period of UNCTAD'S preeminence, when it was the thrust for a new international 
economic order that underlay negotiations over trade and aid. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that both official and academic analyses of the technological 
problems of Indian industry addressed issues centred on the concomitants of 
achieving a new economic order; of evolving a code of conduct for technology 
transfer; on the methodology of bargaining with technology suppliers; and, 
22 more generally, on the methods of acquiring adequate technological knowledge 
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in each agreement, so that 'repetitive' imports of technology were obviated . 
(India, 1989; Patel, 1982; Subrahmanian, 1972; 1978). 
Simultaneously, there was an awareness of the internal constraints to 
generating technological dynamism: the relatively small size of the internal 
market for most industrial products which, a priori, precluded threshold 
levels of R and D expenditure by firms; the oligopolistic nature of this market 
that deflected attention away from innovation; the presence of conglomerate 
groups whose industrial interests straddled the major sectors of industry and 
presented major barriers to entry of new firms; and the problems inherent in 
the attempt to establish self-reliance through barriers to the ill-effects of the 
world market by the mechanism of administrative controls on imports and 
on foreign exchange transactions (Bagchi, 1971; Desai, 1972; Mitra, 1981). In 
fact, the problem was even more complicated than it would seem: the most 
dynamic firms, Tata Engineering, Bajaj Auto and Escorts, amongst others, all 
belonged to the 'big business groups' and all operated in oligopolistic markets 
(Lal, 1987). However, before it could be established that these stray cases were 
exemplars, rather than oddities, it was necessary to examine the behaviour of 
the large universe of firms that had imported technology and, indeed, even of 
those that had not (Desai, 1984a; 1984b; 1990). The point is that the 
technological base of the economy depends critically not on the market 
leaders, but on the firms that represent what might be termed the 'modal' 
level of competence. This is because the production of complex industrial 
products requires some degree of sub-contracting and this interdependence 
presupposes an equal order of ability, technologically, amongst parts and 
component suppliers and the core manufacturing firms (Bhagavan, 1990). 
Estimation of the 'modal' level of technological development is a major 
exercise, however, requiring estimates in broad aggregates of relevant 
technology specific indicators and detailed case studies (Desai and Taneja, 
1990). 
It is well known that much of the technology transfer across OECD countries 
takes place on a knowledge barter basis, where acquisition in one specific area is 
matched by supply in another (although individual firms may be pure buyers or 
sellers) (Chesnais, 1988). This aspect of technological capability, i.e., the ability to 
provide core technology to firms in other countries while importing the kno- 
whow of other elements had been absent from the Indian concept of self-reliance. 
In India, the concept, related as it was to the public sector, had been largely 
confined to establishing capability within the country itself. The export of 
engineering services and projects undertaken by some public sector units to 
OPEC countries in the 1970s, ironically, represented a unilateral (expertise for 
oil) transfer of knowledge. The Indian presence in the process of international 
technological transfer was limited to joint ventures involving standard engineer- 23 
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o ing knowhow, rather than partnerships with countries of comparable capability 
c- based on complementary knowledge bases (Thomas, 1982; Lal, 1988). 
Qn Effective participation in the international exchange of technological 
C knowledge requires a much greater degree of competence across the entire 
ao industrial spectrum than that existed in India. Unless this spread existed, the 
o more advanced firms were forced to concentrate in-house (the exact analogue 
z of the national technology effort, which had tended to autarchy). This 
mc> inevitably increased costs, but more germane to the present discussion, it 
o reduced the chances of diffusion of more advanced technologies through 
inter-firm cooperation. 
Learning to Make vs. Learning to Make Better 
The half century of developments in India since Independence has 
demonstrated that there is a difference between the expertise required to 
make a commodity and that needed to make it better or cheaper, i.e., to 
innovate. Research in the late 1970s, in fact, confirmed that if the experience 
of production was expected to contribute to technical change, two sets of 
knowledge and information were required. One arose from production 
experience; the other, more general, needed to be acquired from elsewhere (R 
and D activities within the firm or from specialised research institutes) and 
brought into intimate contact with the more immediate and specific 
production experience.4 The production of capital goods alone, important as 
it is, does not in itself imply technological mastery. 
Certainly, for most industrialists, it appeared to be that technology was 
treated as synonymous with plant and machinery: it was seen as something 
fixed and given, an artefact, which was to be acquired (Bell et al, 1982:154). It 
was not something to be adapted and improved, let alone produced through 
any conscious efforts within the firm, possibly with the help of specialised R 
and D institutions. It was something that a firm either had or did not have, 
and in the latter case, it was simply to be bought in the form of the specific 
manufacturing system appropriate for the product. In such a scheme of 
things, 'technical change', i.e., technological upgradation was to be effected 
by the repeated import of the necessary capital goods and production related 
services. A low order of priority (if any at all) was given to investment in 
resources for effecting technical change within the firm. 
Codification of technology, essential for a firm intending to go into the 
business of innovation, is the result of the distillation of the experience of 
technologists and workers, and its subsequent documentation, so that the 
experience becomes replicable (Desai, 1984b). Codification, as embodied in 
designs, specifications, patent descriptions and other documents, is thus a 
24 record of a specific stage of technological evolution. Innovation, defined as 
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the improvement of this record on the basis of experience and 
experimentation is considerably enhanced if there is co-operation between 
the seller of technology, the buyer using the technology, and capital goods 
manufacturers. For innovation, storage, retrieval and revision of information 
within the firm are essential. Conversely, they are not obligatory for building 
up a manufacturing production system with the collaboration of a foreign 
firm. 
This prerequisite reinforces the natural tendency amongst many 
indigenous entrepreneurs to seek modes of response to external stimuli for 
change, which are other than those involving investment in the resources 
necessary to effect a firm's own technical change (Bell et al, 1982:154). The 
competitive response to a firm's economic environment was predominantly 
focused on product differentiation and the associated marketing effort, rather 
than on responses that centred on productive efficiency and on cost and price 
reductions. This diagnosis has been confirmed by empirical investigations 
into Indian firms (Desai, 1984b:245-261). 
Interestingly, even critics of India's Listian development strategy did not 
feel that its policies were obsolete, only that they were misplaced from the 
point of view of productive efficiency and were conducive to 
corruption.(Mirrlees, 1968; Bhagwati and Desai, 1970; National Council of 
Applied Economic Research, 1971; Desai, 1972). It was in the mid-1980s that 
the 'lessons of Japan' and later of South Korea began to draw attention to 
aspects of the system of innovation seemingly far removed from the issues of 
technology. These issues included the historical process by which the 
industrialists as a class developed and the specific forms in which the workers' 
subordination congealed in the change from handicraft production to the 
corporate form of organisation. This was featured in the structure of 
industrial relations legislation that represented, in a legal form, the extant 
resolution of the class struggle. All these issues were recognised in the early 
stages of planned development in India. However, the approach to their 
individual resolution did not take adequate account of the necessity of 
integrating these solutions into the substantive technological features of the 
national system of innovation.5 
Although the colonial Indian economy was predominantly agrarian, it 
had specific features that made it possibly unique in the ex-colonial world. 
Chief amongst these was the relatively highly developed class of business 
entrepreneurs. With the development of the Indian cotton textile industry 
from the mid-19th century and the involvement of Indians in large-scale 
trading activities associated with the imperial industrialised economies, a 
(large-scale) merchant and broker/intermediary community had crystallized 
(Tyabji, 1995). The two World Wars had allowed capital 'accumulation' in 25 
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o other ways, including blackmarketing and swindling in government 
a~ contracts. 
V' With the repatriation of British interests in jute, engineering and 
CD plantations at the time of Independence, and with the home market assured, 
Co such capital 'accumulations' were invested in associated enterprises, 
0(n particularly in eastern India. A large number of very reputable firms thus 
Z came under the control of individuals or groups who had a tenuous 
connection with the industrial economy. The point to be emphasised here is 
0 that while the merchants and broker/intermediaries could appreciate the 
imperatives of the industrialisation process, the other social groups could 
not.6 Overnight they were transformed from members of slightly risque social 
groups, into 'captains of industry'. As T.T. Krishnamachari, Minister for 
Commerce and Industry, was to remind Jawaharlal Nehru, while they might 
privately agree that some industrialists were unsavoury, they were the only 
industrialists that the country had. Business had to be done with them.7 
Doing business, however, was not coterminous with allowing the firms to 
be managed in any way the industrialists chose. Significantly, there is also 
evidence that the necessity of administrative coercion in these matters was 
understood by the more advanced entrepreneurs. Sumant Moolgaonkar of 
the Tata promoted firm of Telco pointed out to Krishnamachari that the 
government was the only agency through which the productive efficiency of 
the manufacturing sector could be increased.8 As an industrial manager, 
Moolgaonkar saw the problem at the level of the individual firm, though it 
actually lay at the level of the social composition of the industrialists. 
Theoretically, the importance of moving away from the firm to the social 
group is emphasised by the role of the state in extending the time horizons of 
the business community. This, along with the appropriate technological 
educational inputs, helps in the problematical transformation of a class of 
merchant-usurers to industrialists (Tyabji, 1989). In India, the major 
instruments for channelling resources into activities necessitating longer 
time-horizons were in the form of legislation, specifically the Capital Issues 
Control Act, the Companies Act and the Industrial Development and 
Regulation Act. All these Acts represented potentially coercive administrative 
measures, aimed at strengthening the 'industrial' characteristics of private 
resource allocation decisions. 
However, a project to extend the timehorizon of an entire social group, 
and that of the dominating social force at that, requires not only the 
acquiescence of such measures by the more advanced sections of this group of 
proto-industrialists; it also requires an adroit combination of these measures 
to ensure compliance with the accumulation norms of an industrial society. 
26 These comprise the distinctive problems that attempts at directing post- 
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Independence economic growth would pose for the political and 
administrative executive. It is, in fact, precisely these attempts to direct and 
regulate processes of economic development, in the period from 1947 to 
1991, that have been severely criticised in recent years. However, the criticism 
(as also the original, publicly stated, policy intention) has ignored the crucial 
role of state-sponsored structural change, which accompanies economic 
growth (and industrial development, in particular) in predominantly 
agrarian societies. 
The importance of moving away from the firm to the social group can be 
further appreciated by a reading of the eccentric, but important article by 
Upendra Trivedi (Trivedi, 1982). It argues that the roots of the lack of 
technological innovativeness lie in the social origins of the Indian capitalist 
community. He draws attention to the fact that even Jamshedjee Tata 
preferred to 'employ foreign professors at fancy salaries' rather than support 
Mahendralal Sircar's efforts based on 'purely native genius'. Implicit in the 
article is the view that this short-circuiting of the entire cycle of building up a 
stock of scientific personnel from the roots, by importing a knowledge-base 
of advanced scientific workers at the Indian Institute of Science was the 
model replicated in independent India. In this model the simple import of 
manufacturing hardware supposedly embodied the process of technology 
transfer. Opposing this view, P.M.S. Blackett argued forcefully that countries 
such as India should import those technologies that were as close to the 
technological frontier as possible, subject to their being appropriate in a 
dynamic, long-term sense (Blackett, 1968). 
Trivedi's article is important despite two quite outstanding omissions; 
the first being one on the role of the state in extending the time horizons of 
the business community, while the second is the historical contestation 
between industrialists and workers, which creates both capitalists and 
workers (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985:53). State encouragement towards 
long-term investments, along with the appropriate technological educational 
inputs, helps in the problematical (and celebrated) transformation of a class 
of merchant-usurers into industrialists. 
Even in the colonial era, there were stray cases of individual bureaucratic 
efforts to help this process along in the case of small-scale industry using 
rudimentary technology, if not handicraft skills (Tyabji, 1995). However, 
clearly, any major effort at transformations of this kind can only be sought in 
the post-Independence state structure. With the help of Trivedi's 
propositions, the issue can be reformulated in sharper terms: what were the 
philosophical and organisational-administrative shortcomings in the 
structure of the Indian state apparatus that led not only to the continued 
apathy towards innovation, but even to the near collapse of the Indian 27 
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o manufacturing class in the post-1991 period? 
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+c, As against this argument, there were outstanding exceptions to the 
general situation in the field of transport/mechanical engineering 
O industries-Telco, Punjab Tractors and Bajaj Auto.9 The point seemed to be 
ok that firms in similar market situations had very different histories of relative 
0U) technological dynamism. If policies had really been to condone, if not 
Z actually to encourage, the repetitive process of technology imports, or of the 
frequent extensions to collaboration agreements, the behaviour of such firms 
o was inexplicable. Their success highlighted the importance of granting 
technological volition or agency, an aspect of entrepreneurship, its legitimate 
explanatory role. It was the quality of the leadership that informed the 
decision-making systems of the firms, the degree to which operating 
personnel and R and D organisations should be positively encouraged to 
interact, as also various other features of plant and firm management that 
were equally important factors. 
The National System of Innovation in India was notably silent on the 
question of the obsolete methods of management of industrial relations and 
underlying these, attitudes towards historical changes in the labour process."'10 
Although there were discrete historical stages in the post-Industrial 
Revolution evolution of the labour process, until the 1970s, the labour 
process was one associated with its then predominant form: the large-scale 
assembly line manufacturing standardised products for mass markets, i.e., 
with Henry Ford's innovations.11 It was with the plant visits to Japanese 
automobile manufacturers in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that 
representatives of the US industry learnt, to their great surprise, that the 
source of Japanese superiority lay not in advanced manufacturing technology, 
but in the adoption of a new phase in the evolution of the labour process, 
associated with management practices known variously as just-in-time, or 
Toyotaism (Kaplinsky, 1991:592-93). 
Even in countries where the managerial ethos is more advanced than in 
Indian business houses, the challenges posed by the Japanese example were 
acute. The message that a process of economic transformation was underway 
is not lost on managers in Europe and the United States. The biggest barrier is 
a social one, of transforming a way of industrial life organised around the 
principles of Taylor's scientific management. The gains in competitiveness 
that firms could achieve with a committed workforce were apparent, but they 
usually failed in these countries because they are imposed within a context of 
a relationship adversarial to the integration of thinking and doing. This was a 
task that required a new definition of both workers and managers. For 
industrial revitalisation, the historical legacy had to be addressed directly. 
28 The legacy derived from the manner in which the class struggle between 
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workers and owner-managers was resolved during transition from the . 
merchant financier/marketer (or the putting-out) system to manufacturing - 
forms of production. The terms of that transformation had a crucial impact 
on the organisation of business enterprises in all countries for decades to 
follow (Best, 1990:252-53). The effect of 19th century working-class struggles 
in Britain in spurring technological advances in manufacturing is now a 
familiar story. Although the struggles were intended to improve working 
conditions in general, and to shorten the working hours in particular, their 
effect was also to intensify competitive pressures on individual firms. 
Adoption of better machinery and management practices was the most 
creative, even if not the most widespread, response to these pressures. 
In the Indian context, the diffusion of reforms in managerial practices, 
initiated in isolated cases as a result of pressures from below, were inevitably 
long drawn out processes. Although the Bombay textile industry completed 
the transition from managerial commission on the basis of production to a 
system of commission on profits by the 1920s, Ahmedabad textile interests 
continued with the old system for a much longer period. In the textile 
industry, the jobber's role as a recruiting/disciplining agent remained largely 
unchanged, though it was subject to intense workers' opposition during 
periods of heightened class struggle, up to the late 1940s. The attempt to 
shorten the working day lasted from 1875 to 1948 when an amended 
Factories Act granted recognition to an eight-hour day.12 The managing 
agency, as an organisational form, still continued until as late as 1969. 
The logic of this argument lays great emphasis on the attitudes towards 
workers and towards shopfloor management that Indian industrialists have 
displayed at critical moments in recent history. The rationale for this lies in a 
point made well in an article incorporating the 'social analysis of economic 
history' of the United States: that in historiographical terms, an analytical 
approach based on the perceptions of significant individuals and institutions 
can provide the outlines of an alternative (Livingstone, 1987:82). 
Conclusions 
An analysis of the Japanese experience has highlighted both the historical 
nature of the problem of technological dynamism and the historically 
determined context in which the solution evolved. The problem lay in the 
nature of contemporary technology and the forms in which innovation was 
currently expressed. These factors determined the technical aspects of public 
interventions, appropriate for their encouragement. However, the solution 
was composed of two more elements: the way in which the industrialists 
themselves had evolved as a social group, principally through contestation, 
both with competing industrialists and the working class; and a related issue, 29 
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0 
o the specific forms in which workers' subordination to the power of industrial 
a- managers congealed in the course of the highly contested change from 
CJ') handicraft production to the factory form of organisation. This 
? subordination was expressed both in the organisation of work and authority 
cso (management practices) within the firm, and in the structure of industrial 
o3 relations legislation. The legislation, in particular, represented in a legal form 
z the society-wide resolution of the contestation. These ingrained features, of 
firm-level management practices and industry-level industrial relations, set 
o limits to the effects that market competition alone could have on building 
pressures for technologically productive change, unless the historically 
determined issues were simultaneously addressed. 
These issues lay in the domain of political economy and could only be 
satisfactorily settled by initiatives taken at the political level of the state 
executive. Interestingly, all the three components of the official Indian 
perception of technology capability creation (the 'National System of 
Innovation') were the result of political initiatives. Most significant was the 
proposal for the public ownership of specific industries where technology 
acquisition was perceived to require the evaluation of a range of non- 
commercial considerations. As a result, manufacturing capabilities were 
established in industries identified as representing critical additions to the 
stock of technological knowledge. The second prong of the strategy consisted 
of import-substituting industrialisation, embodied in the phased 
manufacturing programme (PMP). This programme, which envisaged the 
systematic increase in the proportion of components manufactured 
indigenously, was an essential part of all foreign technological collaboration 
agreements in large-scale industries. Finally, there was encouragement of 
reverse engineering, of copying and improvisation, principally through 
support to the small-scale industrial sector. 
On two matters of critical significance, however, the design of the Indian 
innovation system was silent: first, on the conditions of existence of industrial 
workers, even from the point of view of improving their 'efficiency', and second, 
on the modernisation of the system of industrial relations, in order to introduce 
true collective bargaining. Consequently, the innovation system, by ignoring the 
labour process, denoted an exclusively 'engineering' conception of technology. 
This was a surprising lapse. From the very beginning of modern industry 
in India in the pre-Independence period, Indians were acutely aware of the 
obstacles facing the development of a machine building industry. By default, 
Indian industry could advance technologically only through the route of 
improvements to the labour process, whether this followed a capitalist or a 
philanthropic imperative. Thus, there was in India the possibility of the early 
30 recognition that both the labour process and the 'engineering' process were 
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organic components of technology, and of this comprehension becoming 
generalised as the commonsense of Indian industrialists. 
However, there is another issue: the legacy of the trade union movement 
as it emerged in Ahmedabad and Bombay. A Gandhian inspired topdown 
organisation, the Textile Labour Association in Ahmedabad and a 
determined effort by communists to organise the Bombay textile workers 
provided two competing models of organising the relationship between 
managers and workers. The specific combination of institutional measures 
selected by the industrialists-of the managing agency system, jobbers, 
Gandhian-inspired trade unionism and, above all, the objective of preventing 
the continuing communist domination of the textile workers-set the 
framework for the legal structure of industrial relations. Post Independence 
support by the state to trade unions with a leadership hostile to Marxism 
created a piquant situation where collective bargaining could not be 
established as a general, legally supported principle for the conduct of 
industrial relations. 
The result of this is that the evolution of the labour process in Indian 
industry as a whole has not developed even to the stage of Taylorism. While 
Western attempts to refine the division of labour were principally motivated 
by wage-cost reductions, subsequent stages clearly had the intention of 
reducing workers' bargaining position, based on their privileged knowledge 
of shopfloor working conditions. These stratagems were necessitated by the 
right to collective bargaining that the recognition of trade unions and 
industrial relations legislation had brought about. In India, the absence of 
collective bargaining, and the perpetuation of trade union leadership 
committed to the consolidation of managements' existing powers (even if this 
leadership is extreme in pushing for workers' monetary benefits), has 
precluded the necessity of advances to Taylorism and Fordism. A legacy of 
acrimonious industrial relations has left complex problems for managerial 
regimes that now wish to move towards Toyotaism, just-in-time and other 
features characterising Japanese systems of industrial management. These are 
predicated on trust and a movement in the centre of gravity of management- 
worker contestation. 
Had the appropriate changes taken place, then Indian industry might 
have developed its own version of the link between the knowledge-to-make 
and the knowledge-to-make-better, currently seen as hallmarks of the 
Japanese National System of Innovation. All these issues were, in fact, 
recognised in the early stages of planned development in India. However, the 
approach to their individual resolution did not take adequate account of the 
necessity of integrating these solutions into the substantive technological 
features of the 'National System of Innovation'. 31 
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0 
o 
o So, Indian developments do not show an entire absence of 0 
-~ comprehension of what technology constitutes, particularly in the post-war 
Q) era of the 'Age of Automation'. There are sound reasons, then, why analysis of 
o the technological features of Indian industrial developmental experience is of 
Qc importance. A systematic review of the reasons why the scattered elements of 
o3 comprehension were not coherently integrated in Indian policy initiatives is 
Z critical even now, if Indian industrialisation is to advance. Also, the Indian 
mc? experience can provide important guidelines for other economies that have 
o had similar problems in the transition from manufacture to innovation. 
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Notes 
I In the late 1980s, a study could comment that... it seems clear that policy is not 
designed or administered to generate a positive effect on the depth and breadth of 
the knowledge acquired by Indian firms. There appears to be no positive 
incentive to induce firms to increase these two aspects of the technological 
content of the agreements they enter into. 
Scott-Kemmis and Bell (1988): 96 [emphasis in original]. 
2 It is ironic that contemporaneously with the growth of such lines of criticism, 
information about Japanese methods of increasing productivity without re- 
course to economies of scale became generally known. In particular, the 
innovation associated with the Toyota production system. See Coriat (1991). 
3 In attempts to grapple with solutions to these problems, issues such as the lack of 
correspondence between the various stages of the entire innovation chain (basic 
research, applied research, invention, development, innovation) and appropriate 
institutions was identified. It was also noted that even when the basic knowledge 
incorporated in earlier stages of the innovation chain were publicly funded, the 
financial costs of the later stages of this chain devolved almost entirely on the 
private firm. Parthasarathi (1987). 
4 Bell et al. (1982): 151; Suri (1968). Studies by CSIR in the mid-1960s provided 
evidence of the complete disjuncture between areas of CSIR research and the 
bulk of technological collaboration agreements. 
5 See, for example, the comment made in the introductory paragraphs of the 1952 
Committee on Company Law: 
A34 A further limitation to the scope of our enquiry arises from the fact that, 
Learning to Innovate vs. Learning to Manufacture 
although we are concerned with the efficient working of the corporate form of 
organisation, the problems of industrial management and industrial relations 
which closely affect it are outside our scope.... Structural and procedural 
improvements can only create conditions; the efficiency and vigorous working of 
private enterprise must primarily depend upon the initiative and drive of the 
management, the organisational and directing ability of managers and the other 
supervisory staff who are in day-to-day charge of a business undertaking; the 
technical efficiency of all grades of labour and last but not the least on sound and 
harmonious relations between labour and management. No reform of company 
law can secure these desiderata and to that extent the contribution of a sound 
system of company law to the "efficient and economic management of compa- 
nies or the development of Indian trade and industry" must be necessarily 
limited. 
India (1952): 13. 
6 The most prominent of these, Haridas Mundhra, became notorious in the mid- 
1950s due to his cavalier disregard for any norms of'industrial behaviour'. 
7 Letter dated 2 September 1954. T.T. Krishnamachari papers, Subject File 8(A): 
121, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. (Subsequently, TTK papers, 
NMML.) 
8 Personal letter from Sumant Moolgaokar of Tata Sons, to T.T. Krishnamachari, 
Minister of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 5 October 1953. TTK 
papers, NMML. 
9 cf. Ashok Desai's comment in 1984 that neither Telco nor Bajaj Auto would be 
able to negotiate a major technology transfer agreement precisely because they 
were potentially serious exporters. Desai (1984b): 247. 
10 In this context, the labour process refers to the system in which human beings of 
different skill levels are brought together with different sets of machines. This, 
looser, concept allows for the fact that machines designed to serve the same 
physical function may be set up with alternative forms of control devices, giving 
greater or lesser play to the control by workers over production. cf. Kaplinsky 
(1991):578. 
11 The historical stages may be conveniently associated with their most prominent 
advocates as follows: 1. The first division of labour in manufacturing (Adam 
Smith) 2. The separation of skilled and unskilled tasks, allowing wage differen- 
tials and reduced wage costs (Charles Babbage) 3. Mechanisation of processes 
requiring dexterity, thus reducing the autonomy of skilled craftsmen (Andrew 
Ure) 4. Concentration of production knowledge within management with broad 
based de-skilling (Taylor) 5. Regulation of the production process through the 
production line (Henry Ford). 
12 For the record, it may be noted that in 1862, 1,200 workers of the Howrah 
railway station struck work on the demand for an 8-hour working day. Ghosh 
(1966): 8. 
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